He is currently one of the fiercest critics of liberalism in the US, notably from a conservative perspective. In his book Why Liberalism Failed, which Barack Obama described as profound a few years ago, despite stating he disagreed with most of its conclusions, he argues that the principles of liberalism have led to social fragmentation and the erosion of social bonds.

A favorite author of US Vice President J.D. Vance, yet popular even within Democratic political circles, Patrick Deneen describes himself as a moderate conservative. We spoke with him about the shock brought on by this new era, whether Trump is the cause or a symptom, the elites that are inevitably created by every political system, and how we can prevent them from becoming detached from the people.

Interview by Antonis D. Papagiannidis and Konstantinos Tsalakos

(Published in Economic Review - April 2026)

Post-liberalism

A few years ago, you wrote about Why Liberalism Failed. More recently, you were speaking about a "post-liberal future." Could you elaborate on your thoughts? Do you consider liberalism to have been a period in history – a long one, yes, but one that has ended – and that we are transitioning into a new era? Or is it that liberalism has caused some sort of damage, and that is why we are trying to move past it?

Liberalism is a philosophy that, in order to flourish, requires a whole series of non-liberal prerequisites, commitments, and political practices. Things that are not inherently liberal from a philosophical standpoint. What has happened over the last 20 years, let's say certainly in the US, but I believe in the West more broadly? It is an expansion of the philosophical aspect of liberalism, but one that places emphasis on individual autonomy and economic liberalism – what we (Americans) call conservatism, but is actually economic liberalism; Europeans are more grounded in this regard – and it ends up undermining the sense of national belonging, the concept of a shared fate, and the acceptance of a set of responsibilities and rules.

Whose responsibilities?

Those of the economically successful toward those who are not economically successful. Thus, as the combination of social, economic, and political phenomena becomes increasingly liberal, it undermines liberalism itself. It causes damage, as you said. But primarily, it undermines the legitimacy of liberalism. A negative consequence of this is what we often refer to as a right-wing shift, nationalism, and so on. Ultimately, however, it is a reaction of the social and political body, somewhat like an immune system's response to a kind of disease.

Of course, health analogies in politics are risky...

The truth is that immune responses – to continue with this analogy – often have side effects. However, dismissing these kinds of political reactions as something incomprehensible or unfamiliar, or as something that just falls from the sky, amounts to avoiding looking at the deeper sources of the problem. Which, ironically, stem from the liberal order itself.

Give us an example or two of what you are referring to, before we move on to what post-liberalism means or entails for you.

Look: one example stems from what ultimately functions as a global economic ruling classroom; namely, people who have more in common with each other. You here at the Delphi Economic Forum have a similar point of reference, based on the Davos model: members of this ruling class meeting with one another, exchanging ideas that share fewer national or cultural proximities, and that transcend any given national, religious, or cultural framework.

Ironically, this arrangement ends up mimicking the aristocracy of the past, where kings, princes, and princesses intermarried and had no sense of national borders. Recall how British monarchs often had German roots...

And the consequence of what you are describing?

Oh, the consequence is a resulting lack of legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary citizens and nations; the fact that this ruling class has no connection to average people. This, for me, is the source of what we consider populism today. Which constitutes – in a way – a democratic rejection of the ruling class's claims...

Elites and their detachment from ordinary citizens

Meaning anti-elitism...

A particular kind of anti-elitism. I am not a radical, nor a Marxist, nor an egalitarian. I do not believe we can live in a classless society. To be honest, every society generates its elite. That is inevitable. The question here is this: what is the relationship between the elites and ordinary citizens? Namely, those with whom they coexist in the course of history.

Otherwise?

Otherwise, we end up with the ruling class becoming completely detached from regular people. Aristotle had already recognized this in his Politics. That is precisely why he was an advocate of a mixed approach to classes, to create a sense of shared destiny. To return to my initial argument, what we are currently experiencing is a reaction to this specific brand of elitism that emerged – essentially – during the era of globalization, let's say from the 1980s onward.

Forms of political organization: city-state, empire, nation-state...

Isn't the nation-state actually a relatively new creation in human history? From the post-Enlightenment era…

Perhaps we need to go even further back. To the 16th century. The nation-state, as a concept, predates the Enlightenment. Until then, the dominant forms of political organization were twofold: the city-state, as born in Greece (which, however, continually faced threats due to its inability to defend itself against neighbors), while the other form was the empire.

In the East, and later in Rome.

One form proved to be too small to protect itself, while the other ended up too large to maintain its cohesion. Thus, in the latter case, authoritarianism emerged as a means to hold the various parts together: the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and so on.

So, in empires, authoritarianism comes somewhat naturally.

Certainly! Montesquieu recognizes despotism as a core element of empires... In this sense, the nation-state may have been slow to emerge, but it functioned in the Aristotelian sense of the mean – a balance between two extremes. It is not so small that it cannot defend itself, nor so large that it requires internal oppression. In the West, we essentially saw this shift toward the nation-state as a form of organization that incorporated elements of local governance. It has the cohesiveness that characterizes a city-state, where citizens recognize themselves, whereas an empire is coupled with governance from a great distance. To me, the nation-state remains the philosophically preferable model of government: it is not a perfect model, but it is defensible.

... and the transition to the era of spheres of influence

 

And yet, what we are experiencing today seems like a fourth type of political governance. Indirect rule, the indirect exercise of influence, through spheres of influence. We are seeing the return of the Monroe Doctrine in the West/the US, while a counterpart is taking shape in the East—"the West vs. the Rest," and so on.

 

To me, what we have before us is a kind of return to how nations and countries used to be organized. In this sense, to also provide an answer to your initial question, post-liberalism is at the same time pre-liberal. The belief after World War II was that countries could be integrated into some sort of liberal empire. An empire that would no longer need to rely on oppression, but would instead be a kind of "soft" empire. One relying, essentially, on American military power. Yet, hidden within this model of governance, one could discern the acceptance of spheres of influence: the US would exert significant influence over Europe, and other powers elsewhere. At the core of all this was a logic of universalism: that is, it accepted the existence of nation-states, but theoretically and philosophically, it did not consider their existence a prerequisite. And, to a large extent, it aspired to transcend that existence. So, one could indeed speak of such a form of organization, from a global perspective.

The universal state.

Yes, the universal state – whether tracing it back to Kojève, or Martha Nussbaum's cosmopolitanism, or even Kant's approach to the universal ideal. So, what exactly happened? It turned out to be an internally unsustainable situation.

Why is that?

First of all, the notion that the system was not based on nations was an illusion: of course it relied on the national sentiment of Americans themselves, on American military power. However, this proved to be unacceptable to American citizens. To the citizens, not the elite! The elites were thrilled to have things handled this way—this artificially global liberal empire, this liberal universal state. But look: American citizens had started saying, "We are tired of having a military that has to operate pretty much everywhere across the globe, while our own country lives with high crime rates, internal decay, crumbling infrastructure, and a drug issue." Therefore, it wasn't Donald Trump who created the situation we are living through; rather, he was the reaction to what liberal American hegemony had built. Everyday citizens simply realized they had a vehicle at their disposal to express their discontent. The discontent was there, ever-present; it was the political class that was ignoring this discontent. This is the core of my effort to correct the misconception held by many – both in academia and the broader public – who claim: "All of this is the evil that Donald Trump brought upon us; this is the guy who caused all these bad things to happen."

Whereas?

Whereas in reality, Trump is merely the highly unusual – unique, I would say – channel for expressing this discontent of the average American. This, after all, is what brought about the broader support for Trump, a support that surprised the ruling class, which had completely overlooked – had not even sensed – this discontent.

Universalism and globalization

Before we step into the Trump dimension – which, after all, is impossible to ignore in this conversation – could you tell us whether, in your view, economic globalization as we experienced it (in its rise and retreat) was what "killed" the era of universalism? In other words, did economic excess kill political governance?

The root of populist discontent was certainly economic. Both in the US and in Europe. Especially among the working-class strata, and notably in areas of industrial decline – I myself live in an area right next to automotive hubs that fell into decline or shut down. And the towns that hosted them collapsed. Therefore, all these claims that globalization leads to a higher GDP, to greater prosperity for the US, clashed with the large pockets of decline across the country. These communities simply could not follow or accept such perspectives. They were being told that this general prosperity would help them, yet their hometowns were collapsing.

And is that a sufficient explanation?

Alongside that, there is also the political dimension. And the military one, as well. Just look at the universities, as well as the other mechanisms whose operations filter down to the general population – like the press. The history of the US, the legacy of the Western tradition – all references to Ancient Greece or the Middle Ages 00 took on the form of a narrative of oppression, injustice, racism, homophobic violence, and whatever other sin one could imagine. The elites of the universities and the journalists – all those who manage society – supported things that ran contrary to intuitive assumptions, and even to the traditional patriotism that in this country – in the US – was synonymous with good. Problems existed, and they were acknowledged, but the prevailing belief was that there was an overarching good.

Do you consider Trump to be the result of what you are describing?

A gap was established between the official narrative – how the history of the past is to be perceived, even down to the monuments built to honor that past – and the everyday perception of things by everyday people. And this, you know, was another form of universalism: the ruling class stepped in to declare that "what connects us all is a shared understanding that we must transcend the past, that the past is nothing more than a set of backward views." This is the trajectory that was named the "woke" approach. A universal way of perceiving history and power dynamics. Generally speaking, this was an upper-class phenomenon; regular citizens did not share this approach. So, to answer your question: yes, you can look for an economic explanation, you can look for a cultural explanation, or you can even look for an explanation in military terms. But ultimately, what was acting as an unseen and neglected backlash rose up like a wave from below.

... and gave us Donald Trump.

Which yields Trump, which yields the populist parties across Europe. Look at Brexit, as a result. In any case, it is not a localized phenomenon, specific only to the US, for example. Although, then again, "when America sneezes, the world catches a cold," as the old adage goes.

And "when America goes to war," what does the rest of the world do?

The world gets infected with a very nasty virus, I would say. That is why I, too, am having a hard time processing everything that has been unfolding over these past few weeks. Because you can perceive Trumpism and its corresponding populist versions as phenomena of a "politics of resentment," as a violent backlash. But if you pay closer attention, if you listen more carefully, you will discern a kind of program. Trump, then, began to redefine what conservatism had been since the end of World War II.

What conservatism was, and what it is

And what resulted from that?

Especially in the US, conservatism was a combination of anti-communism (the Cold War, the confrontation with the Soviet Union) along with a correspondingly strong military presence. This culminated in a willingness to use American military capabilities to bring about regime change in a liberal direction.

Such as?

That was the ambition in Iraq, in any case. I am not exactly sure if that is the ambition today in Iran as well.

Who dares to predict!

No one can be certain about the next turn of events. However, the second dimension was fiscal, economic liberalism—which we in America categorize under conservatism in opposition to Marxism, but which is actually embedded within the liberal approach. Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek... that whole economic tradition. But there is also a third dimension: that of social conservatism. This dimension is particularly appealing to the religious Right in the US, dealing with "below the belt" issues, such as abortion or same-sex marriage, and so on. This sort of alliance, then, elected Ronald Reagan twice; it elected George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush twice; it elected many to the House of Representatives. After the end of the Cold War, this alliance began to disintegrate, as it was not a natural grouping.

It's almost like a coexistence of distinct approaches that are fundamentally opposed at their core...

Yes. And their primary function is to oppose the Left, the progressive in the US.

So, it's an "anti-" movement.

Exactly, it's a coalition built on being "anti-". So, when this incarnation begins to disintegrate, many forces try to hold it together – big money, major influence – with the Republican Party attempting to serve as a more permanent expression of this combination of interests...

"And thus, Trump emerges"

And then, along comes Trump!

Then comes a new arrangement for conservative politics, brought about by Trump. It would cease to be pro-war or hawkish: in 2018, Trump clashed with Jeb Bush [the President's younger brother] over the issue of Iraq, but he also clashed with the libertarian elements of liberalism...

How so?

He proposes restricting immigration, and he advocates for measures to support and develop domestic industry. In other words, he has turned against two of the three pillars of conservatism. Furthermore, even on the issue of social conservatism, it is not entirely clear where exactly he stands.

And how do you back up that claim?

In his first term, he appoints judges to the Supreme Court who would go on to overturn Roe v. Wade. In the second term, however, he abandons this subject; he stops addressing the socially conservative audience. He steps in and rewrites the old arrangement of American conservatism. Believe me: I did not have this overturning on my radar. Nor that we would find ourselves at war with Iran.

And what is your interpretation?

I see three potential explanations. First, there is the explanation of a crazy or impulsive pivot. Second, it could be that the old guard of conservatives – those referred to as neo-cons, like Lindsey Graham (a senator and advocate of interventionism), and I think Marco Rubio [currently Secretary of State] too – who are more aggressive in projecting military power, convinced him that it was a good choice. The third explanation – following the invasion of Venezuela, which could be interpreted as a resort to the Monroe Doctrine, under the logic of spheres of influence – might be the perception that he could bring about a resolution to the Middle East problem. Once and for all. I believe that Donald Trump, with his victory in 2024 at any rate, won the majority almost entirely due to the middle class's backlash against the woke social trend [...]

What is "aristo-populism"

Indeed, regarding the other concept of "aristo-populism," which you also introduce in your work, how will it ensure that these new elites, these new "aristoi," will operate for the benefit of "the many"? One could argue that it borders on a form of Caesarism, or at least authoritarianism. And one more thing... Your name, as you know, frequently comes up in connection with J.D. Vance: would the Trump administration be, for you, a version of "aristo-populism"?

Look: there is no political system, there is ultimately no politics that does not face the danger just mentioned. Liberalism obviously faces the danger, and aristocracy faces this danger – every political system faces it. The advantage of liberalism is that it relies on a series of mechanisms – the rule of law, the courts, the logic of institutional checks and balances – except that this is like relying on an assumption: on the ruling class having a proper character. That is, relying not on the mechanisms themselves, but on the spirit of those mechanisms. The mechanisms themselves, on their own, are not enough.

What does this mean in practice?

This is something we are seeing today. I have lived through many Presidents, and almost all of them invoke powers that are supposedly inherent in the Constitution, even if they are not explicitly stated. We now have the experience of governing by executive orders...

And let's not overlook the phenomenon of scandals. You experience them in your country, and we experience them in ours.

Checks and balances were not enough. The only guarantee is sound character. You might think I am referring back to very old concepts and categories, but I believe the ruling class should consist of people with sound character – the "aristoi" [the best] in this sense – good, exceptionally high-quality individuals. However, what will restrain them from acting solely in their own self-interest is the existence of a robust popular element, or populus. In other words, a body politic that defends itself. This is the argument of Aristotle or Polybius; there is nothing new about this argument.

But exactly what I am saying means that there will also be instances where the demos [the people] itself is corrupt, crude, coarse, and harsh: this is the worst version of populism. That is where you need a proper ruling class to restrain, to teach, to speak to the people, and to correct attitudes. But there will also be cases where the aristocratic or oligarchic classes, the plutocrats, will govern solely for their own interests. Without caring about the impact of such governance on the average citizen—those with whom they share the same borders, the same national identity. That is where the people need to demand the correction of the ruling class.

So?

We find ourselves in a "Machiavellian moment," a moment of conflict between the people and the ruling class. This is the phase where institutional checks and balances are of critical importance. To repel the ambition that might take root in someone's soul to become a dictator or to govern while ignoring others.

And where do we stand, in this particular instance?

I believe that – as I already explained at the beginning – we have lived through a period where globalized elites had organized the world, from economies to educational institutions, to serve their own interests. And a populist backlash emerged against this. So, my approach to aristo-populism is – you know, I am a teacher, and I teach elites, so I have to confront the expectation that things should remain as they are – to achieve something akin to reconciliation. That is what I state in my book Regime Change.

Which amounts to what?

To a blending. To a greater mutual understanding between both sides. Meaning that people who work in institutions like universities, or journalists, politicians, and those running foundations and NGOs, will have a better grasp of what the reality is five kilometers away from where they live or where the others live. My university might overlook what happens just down the road; and I am sure the same applies in London, Rome, or Athens. Five kilometers away live regular people, the working class—and there, things are very different.

It surely doesn't escape your notice that references to "regime change" evoke something very specific, especially in the times we are living in!

Certainly. Of course, when I titled that book Regime Change, it was a bit like undermining what was being pursued in Iraq back then. But it also contained a self-aware element: that what was pursued in Iraq – namely, destroying those who governed society (and again now, in Iran, we eliminated a number of leaders) – was nowhere near enough to change the underlying system. That is what is truly difficult. The same goes for my book: I am not interested in dismantling the ruling class's understanding, but rather in changing the deeper prevailing worldview. To push toward a situation where the lives of our current ruling class interconnect with the lives of ordinary citizens. Which have ended up completely separated now. In America, yes, but I believe something very similar applies to Europe as well.

Where today's disruption will lead

Are you at all optimistic about this?

No. Not at all. Anyway, you essentially asked me if the Trump administration is an example of what I describe as "aristo-populism." My answer is that we are at a somewhat earlier stage of such an evolution: the disruption of the ruling class's status quo. For me, things could evolve in various directions. I will not say that the disruption I'm referring to is, in and of itself, what one would desire. It was necessary for this disruption to occur; besides, it was inevitable if you look at how things were going. But it could also have a very dangerous outcome. In fact, I would say it is already moving in a very dangerous direction.

What do you mean by that?

We have governing elements that appear to be fundamentally corrupt. There is also a tendency toward demagoguery – you are familiar with similar phenomena from ancient Greek history, where demagogues exploited the citizens' sense of frustration to offer populist solutions that primarily benefited themselves. However, what people in positions like mine can do is articulate an argument – and hope that their reasoning will mobilize younger generations. Those who, a few years from now, will find themselves in leadership positions.

Another issue: one might observe that many in the Trump administration made a lot of money during the first phase of this Presidency...

Certainly.

... instead of working for the benefit of 'the many.' However, when you speak of conservative post-liberalism, do you think there could also be a progressive post-liberalism? In other words, if the liberal order appears to be collapsing today, and one sees a cohesive response from the conservative side of the spectrum, could we see something similar from the progressive, the left side? Something along the lines of Mamdani, for example."

Well, let me tell you, I have written a relevant article in a book that will be published in German. I believe that the Mamdani version could be a possibility, a Marxist version of post-liberalism. In American terms, this operates as the Left – after all, New York is a unique case. However, it is more likely to evolve in this direction in Europe, which has a longer and deeper Marxist tradition. There is certainly also a very dangerous, far-right version of this evolution, shifting toward a more radical – one might say Nietzschean – Right. On the one hand, the Marxist Left; on the other, a Nietzschean Right. My own efforts would be directed toward something distinctly more moderate, something in the center that – if one looks beneath the surface – cannot merely be approached as the Right or conservatism, but points more toward what Christian Democracy used to be. What German Christian Democracy, or its French equivalent, was after World War II. Something that, on the economic side of things, would feature a much more social dimension of the state – not fully socialist, as it would recognize the values of the free market, but it would treat it as a social market with a more well-funded safety net for ordinary citizens. At the same time, however, it would take a clearly more conservative stance in the social sphere.

In an era where young people face difficulty – an almost inability – to start a family, have children, and buy a home, the center of a society's stability will precisely be the creation of the next generation. If we do not achieve this, then frankly, it doesn't matter much what the GDP is or how many smart bombs we acquire. The issue is for the next generation to be able to start a family and find their place in society.

And how does this translate into American terms?

I would point to what the Democratic Party used to be. Today, of course, things are different: it is not enough to simply say, "People should be able to start a family"; you also need to design policies that will actually help people start a family and raise their children. Especially in the US, where there is such intense economic liberalism on the Right, while on the Left we see an attitude that is not at all friendly toward traditional family structures, I believe a fairly moderate stance should prevail.

I am not certain if the Republican Party is currently in a position to shape such a framework. I have, however, had quite a few discussions with Democrats about these ideas – and some of them showed interest. The Trump version is not the only one available; there is a centrist version in American politics. However, due to extreme libertarian positions )on the economy on the right side of the spectrum, and on social issues on the left ) it makes it almost impossible to reconstructed. It is almost as if we are starting the synthesis of the political landscape from scratch.